

Message Text

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S E C R E T USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA 5317

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SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 5, 1973 (SALT TWO-296)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON
AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 5, 1973.

MR MINISTER:

TODAY, I WILL BRIEFLY ADDRESS MYSELF TO CERTAIN ASPECTS OF
YOUR STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 2. IN THAT STATEMENT THE SOVIET SIDE
AGAIN PROPOSED THAT THE NUMERICAL LIMITATIONS ON ICBM AND SLBM
LAUNCHERS SPECIFIED IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT SHOULD BE CARRIED
OVER TO THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC
OFFENSIVE ARMS. AS I HAVE SAID EARLIER, WE CANNOT ACCEPT THIS
SOVIET PROPOSAL.

IN YOUR OCTOBER 2 STATEMENT, MR. MINISTER, YOU SUGGESTED
THAT A THOROUGH ANALYSIS OF "LONG-TERM FACTORS OF A MILITARY
STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL NATURE" HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. AS I HAVE POINTED OUT, THE
FACTORS WHICH WERE CONSIDERED AT THAT TIME WERE CONSIDERED
SOLELY WITHIN THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT

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WHICH WAS SCHEDULED TO LAST FOR NOT MORE THAN FIVE YEARS. IT

IS PRECISELY THE FACTORS WITH LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS WHICH MUST NOW BE EXAMINED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT OF MUCH LONGER DURATION.

THERE IS NO PROVISION IN ANY OF THE AGREED GUIDANCE FOR OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO SUPPORT THE SOVIET CONTENTION THAT THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT MUST BE INCORPORATED INTO THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. ON THE CONTRARY, THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT IS SET FORTH IN ARTICLE VII OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT ITSELF. THAT ARTICLE SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT "SHALL NOT PREJUDICE THE SCOPE OR TERMS OF THE LIMITATIONS ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH MAY BE WORKED OUT IN THE COURSE OF FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS." THERE IS NO ISSUE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES THAT THE SCOPE OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE BROADER THAN THAT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET POSITION IGNORES THAT FACT THAT ARTICLE VII CLEARLY STATES THAT THE TERMS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT "SHALL NOT PREJUDICE" THE TERMS OF THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THIS PROVISION OBVIOUSLY APPLIES TO THE TERMS IN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT LIMITING THE SYSTEMS SPECIFIED IN THAT AGREEMENT, AND NOT TO TERMS GOVERNING SYSTEMS NOT INCLUDED IN THAT AGREEMENT. THE WORDS "SHALL NOT PREJUDICE" CLEARLY STATE, WHEREAS CERTAIN TERMS WERE DEEMED APPROPRIATE FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, THAT FACT CARRIES NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE LIMITATIONS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT CONTEXT OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

I DO NOT WISH IN ANY WAY TO SLIGHT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH, TOGETHER WITH THE ABM TREATY, CLEARLY COMMANDS HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE. HOWEVER, I DO WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE PROFOUND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE INTERIM AGREEMENT AND THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT WHOSE COMPLETION IS OUR TASK.

BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE THAT THE INTERIM AGREEMENT CONSTITUTED IN ESSENCE A TEMPORARY FREEZE ON THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS. THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS A SHORT-TERM ARRANGEMENT DESIGNED TO REMAIN IN FORCE FOR NOT MORE THAN FIVE YEARS. THE REASON FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT WAS TO FREEZE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR A TEMPORARY PERIOD AT AGREED

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CEILINGS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE TIME FOR THE TWO SIDES TO WORK OUT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT THAT WOULD ENDURE FOR A MUCH LONGER PERIOD.

AS I HAVE EMPHASIZED PREVIOUSLY, WHAT WAS ACCEPTABLE FOR THE INTERIM AGREEMENT IS NOT THE SAME AS WHAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. THE TASK OF PREPARING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT IS FAR MORE COMPLEX THAN THE COMPLETION OF AN INTERIM

AGREEMENT. WE MUST LOOK DOWN A FAR LONGER ROAD. WE MUST MEASURE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES AGAINST A LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE. WE MUST WEIGH THE IMPACT OF BOTH CURRENT AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN TECHNOLOGY. IN THIS CONNECTION, MR. MINISTER, THE UNITED STATES CANNOT IGNORE THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NEW ICBM PROGRAMS BEING ACTIVELY PURSUED AT THE PRESENT TIME BY THE SOVIET UNION. THE IMPACT OF THE ACTIVE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH A WIDE VARIETY OF NEW ICBMS, MANY OF WHICH INVOLVE THE TESTING OF MIRVS, TAKEN TOGETHER WITH THE VERY LARGE AND GROWING THROW-WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET ICBM FORCE, ILLUSTRATES MOST PERTINENTLY THE TYPE OF CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN DEVELOPING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

THESE ARE SOME OF THE REASONS, MR. MINISTER, THAT WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL TO CARRY OVER THE NUMERICAL LEVELS OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT TO THE PERMANENT AGREEMENT. I PROPOSE, THEREFORE, MR. MINISTER THAT WE TOGETHER ADDRESS OURSELVES AS CONSTRUCTIVELY AS POSSIBLE TO CARRYING OUT THE TASK OF PREPARING A PERMANENT AGREEMENT BASED UPON THE PRINCIPLES OF RECOGNITION OF EACH OTHER'S EQUAL SECURITY INTERESTS, NO UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE, AND ENHANCED STRATEGIC STABILITY IN THE LONG-TERM CONTEXT NECESSARY FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT. JOHNSON

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